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THE INTERNET IS THE NEW
MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS: WHY RILEY
V. CALIFORNIA SUPPORTS NET
NEUTRALITY
Adam Lamparello*
Net neutrality "is absolutely the First Amendment issue of our
time."'
1. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's decision in Riley v. California, which
held that law enforcement officers may not search the content of
an arrestee's cell phone without a warrant, supports a First
Amendment-based internet neutrality doctrine.2 Although Riley
was a Fourth Amendment case, the Court's reasoning reflects a
fundamental truth: the world has changed, and to protect basic civ-
il liberties, the law must change as well.
The Internet is the digital age equivalent of traditional pub-
lic and limited purpose public forums, such as public sidewalks
and town halls, just as cellular telephones are the equivalent of a
private home.3 It enables the free flow of information between
networks, including speech on matters of political, social, and
commercial importance. When internet service providers (ISPs)
manipulate the flow of this information based on a user's identity
or message, such as by charging excessive fees or "traffic shap-
ing," a technique that limits available bandwidth and results in
"slowing down some forms of traffic, like file-sharing, while giv-
Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana Tech Law School.
See Julian Hattem, Al Franken: Net Neutrality is 'First Amendment Issue of
Our Time,' THE HILL (Jul 8, 2014), http://thehill.com/policy/technology/21
1607-franken-net-neutrality-is-first-amendment-issue-of-our-time
2 Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014).
3 See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45
(1983) ("A traditional public forum is property that by long tradition or by gov-
ernment that have been devoted to assembly and debate").
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ing others priority, ' ' they engage in content-based discrimination.5
Thus, just as the First Amendment prohibits the government from
regulating speech in public and limited public forums on the basis
of its content, it should also prohibit ISP and website operators
from doing the same on the Internet. Such conduct is akin to al-
lowing the Boy Scouts to march in the public square, while rele-
gating flag burners to desolated areas, remote deserts or dark al-
leys. These practices thwart the free flow of information, stifle
competition, and hinder open public debate on matters of political,
social, and commercial importance.
In addition, websites permitting users to comment on polit-
ical and social issues,8 such as The National Review Online or the
Huffington Post, hold themselves out as a limited purpose forum
for debate on matters of public concern. 9 Consequently, if such
websites filter or remove non-offensive comments, or restrict ac-
4 Christopher R. Steffe, Why We Need Net Neutrality Now Or: How I Learned to
Stop Worrying and Start Trusting the FCC, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 1149, 1158
(2010).
5 See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and Government Speech, 52
B.C. L. REV. 695, 703 (2011) ("even speech which might otherwise be flatly
prohibited--in other words, speech that falls outside the reach of the First
Amendment--may not be treated differently on the basis of the viewpoint it ex-
presses"); Janet Elizabeth Haws, Architecture As Art? Not in My NeoColonial
Neighborhood. A Case for Providing First Amendment Protection to Expressive
Residential Architecture, 2005 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1625, 1659, fn. 164 (2005)
(quoting Chi. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)). ("the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because
of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content"); Frisby v. Schultz,
487 U.S. 474 (1988) ("[t]he government may not regulate use based on hostili-
ty-or favoritism-towards the underlying message expressed").
6 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (invalidating a statute prohibiting
desecration of the American flag).
7 Steffe, supra note 4, at 1144-45,
8 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S.Ct. 1207, 1216 (2014) (matters of public
concern are those "fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social,
or other concern to the community," or when it "is a subject of legitimate news
interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to the pub-
lic.") (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 144 (1983)); San Diego v.
Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83-84 (2004)).
9 See, Blocher, supra note 3, at 703 (A limited purpose public forum consists of
"public property which the state has opened for use by the public as a place for
expressive activity").
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cess, based on a mere disagreement with the user's message, they
engage in viewpoint discrimination. 10 Because these practices
threaten to undermine free speech protections, the First Amend-
ment should apply to online public and limited purpose forums
through a net neutrality doctrine. Simply put, infringements on
civil liberties that would never be allowed in the physical world
should not be permitted in the virtual world. 11
When ISPs discriminate against Internet speech based on
that speech's content, they are doing precisely what the First
Amendment forbids. In doing so, ISPs are engaging in conduct
that would never be allowed if it were to occur in a public park or
town hall meeting. The American Civil Liberties Union has recog-
nized the dangers present in a world without net neutrality:
Without the principle of network neutrality, "net-
work providers are free to discrimi-
nate." Companies that offer the portals to connect to
the Internet "are not considered 'state actors' that
trigger free speech protections under the First
Amendment.... [T]hey can effectively shut down
the 21st century marketplace of ideas by screening
Internet e-mail traffic, blocking what they deem to
be undesirable content, or pricing users out of the
marketplace."'
12
Permitting ISPs to restrict access or disrupt the free flow of
data is like facing a soda machine and having only three choices:
coke, diet coke, and cherry coke. Thus, absent a compelling justi-
fication that is narrowly tailored to achieve a legitimate goal, ISPs
should be prohibited from undermining a user's First Amendment
freedoms. 13
10 Id.
' See, e.g., Steffe, supra note 4, at 1154-55.
2 See id. at 1160 (quoting Internet Freedom and Innovation at Risk: Why Con-
gress Must Restore Strong Net Neutrality Protection, ACLU (Sept. 22, 2006)
available at http:// www.aclu.org/freespeech/intemet/26829res20060922.html.)
13 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REv.
1267, 1315-16 (2007) (discussing strict scrutiny and stating that "there are three
2015]
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Of course, ISPs (and website operators) are private entities,
but when they have substantial control over a medium "used for
purposes of assembly, communication of thoughts between citi-
zens, and discussing public questions,"' 4 they have the power to
impact users' free speech rights.15 This is not to say that ISPs and
website operators cannot prohibit obscenity,'
6 fighting words,1 7
and defamation,' 8 and, in some cases regulate the time, place, and
manner of speech that may offend particular users.19 They cannot,
crucial steps in applying the formula: (1) identifying the preferred or fundamen-
tal rights the infringement of which triggers strict scrutiny; (2) determining
which governmental interests count as compelling; and (3) giving content to the
requirement of narrow tailoring").
14 United States v. Am. Library Ass'n. 539 U.S. 194, 215 (2003) (holding that
Congress may require public schools and libraries to install web filtering soft-
ware as a condition of receiving federal funding).
15 See, e.g., U.S. v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813
(2000) (invalidating section 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which
requires cable operators to block or scramble adult programming from 6 a.m. to
10 p.m.).
16 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). The Miller Court de-
fined obscenity as follows:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether
'the average person, applying contemporary community
standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals
to the prurient interest ... (b) whether the work depicts or de-
scribes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifical-
ly defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, politi-
cal, or scientific value. Id.
17 See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1992) (defining
fighting words as "those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace").
18 See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1990) (to be de-
famatory, speech must be: (1) published to a third party, (2) false; (3) injure
one's reputation; and (4) cause damages).
19 See Note, Margaret L. Mettler, Graffiti Museum: A First Amendment Argu-
ment for Protecting Uncommissioned Art on Private Property, 111 MICH. L.
REv. 249, 266-67 (2012). The time, place, and manner standard requires that
speech regulations be content neutral:
270
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however, block or slow traffic to suppress unpopular speech, or re-
strict access because of a disagreement with the message-or mes-
senger. After all, the very purpose of the First Amendment is to
promote the "free and robust debate of public issues, ' 2° an "unin-
hibited marketplace of ideas," 21 and the "advancement of
knowledge and the search for truth. ' '22  The Internet is the new
marketplace of ideas.
Accordingly, the First Amendment should protect against
infringements on internet speech in the same manner that the
As long as ordinances are content neutral, they may limit
the time, place, and manner of speech are justified without
reference to the content of the regulated speech" ... "serve a
significant governmental interest" ... are "narrowly tailored to
serve [that] interest," and "leave open ample alternative chan-
nels for communication of the information. Id. (quoting Clark
v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
(1984)).
20 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1996).
21 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S.Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014) (quoting FCC v. League
of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984)).
22 W. Robert Gray, Public and Private Speech: Toward a Practice of Pluralistic
Convergence in Free Speech Values, 1 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 1, 8 (1994); see
also Ann Tucker, Flawed Assumptions: A Corporate Law Analysis of Free
Speech and Corporate Personhood in Citizens United, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
497, 510 (2010). The Court has relied on principles of democracy when uphold-
ing the First Amendment rights of corporations:
[T]here is practically universal agreement that a ma-
jor purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free
discussion of governmental affairs." If the speakers here were
not corporations, no one would suggest that the State could si-
lence their proposed speech. It is the type
of speech indispensable to decision making in a democracy,
and this is no less true because the speech comes from a cor-
poration rather than an individual. The inherent worth of
the speech in terms of its capacity for informing
the public does not depend upon the identity of its source,
whether corporation, association, union, or individual. Id.
(quoting First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 776 (1978)).
5
Lamparello: The Internet is the New Marketplace of Ideas: Why Riley v. Califo
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPA UL J. ART, TECH. & IP LAW [Vol. XXV: 267
Fourth Amendment applied in Riley to protect arrestees from war-
rantless searches of their cell phones. Just as a cell phone is analo-
gous to a private residence,23 in that it stores a substantial amount
of personal papers and effects, 24 the Internet is analogous to a pub-
lic sidewalk and town hall where users express political, social,
and commercial speech. 25 And just as the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness requirement26 prevents law enforcement from
"rummag[ing] at will among a person's private effects, 2a the First
Amendment's prohibition on "regulat[ing] use based on hostility-
or favoritism-towards the underlying message expressed, ' 28 pre-
vents ISPs and some website operators from engaging in content
. .. . . . 29
and viewpoint-based discrimination.
As the Riley Court recognized, we live in a new world,
where technological advances have transformed how, where, and
when we think about basic freedoms. One aspect of that transfor-
23 Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. at 2491.
24 1d. at 2493.
25 See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (holding that schools
that create open forums for use by student groups may not discriminate against
particular groups based on content or viewpoint).
26 See, U.S. CONST., AMEND. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized").
27 Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. at 2492 (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332,
345 (2009)).
28 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 386; see also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455
(1980) (invalidating a ban on residential picketing that exempted labor picket-
ing) (brackets added).
29 See, Steffe, supra note 4, at 1155. Although net neutrality is defined in vari-
ous ways, a common focus is on prohibiting the free flow of information:
Modern-day network neutrality seeks to maintain the Inter-
net's original "dumb," end-to-end architectural principle by
prohibiting common carriers--ISPs--from interfering with the
transmission of packets over their networks, whether by artifi-
cially slowing down or blocking those packets, or by any oth-
er means that selectively inhibits the natural flow of packets
over their network. Id.
272
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mation is to recognize that civil liberties transcend physical space.
They extend to devices, such as cell phones and laptop computers,
where citizens store the type of information that would have been
found in a person's home fifty years ago. Thus, in the same way
that cellular telephones are no longer phones in the traditional
sense, the Internet is not simply a forum where citizens purchase
goods and services. Accordingly, the Court should embrace a new
neutrality doctrine. Part II discusses the Riley decision, particular-
ly the Court's emphasis on protecting privacy rights in digital de-
vices. Part III argues that Riley's rationale applies by analogy to
Internet speech.
II. RILEY V. CALIFORNIA: A NEW JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE DIGITAL
AGE
Riley is the beginning of a new jurisprudence that applies
time-honored constitutional principles to twenty-first century fo-
rums where fundamental civil liberties are exercised and must be
protected. In Riley, the Court unanimously held that law enforce-
ment officers could not search the contents of an arrestee's cell
phone without a warrant. 30 The Court rejected the Government's
argument, based on Chimel v. California, 31 which determined that
warrantless searches of an arrestee's cell phone were permissible
to protect officer safety and preserve evidence. 32 In addition, the
30 Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. at 2495.
31 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
32 Id. at 762-763. In Chimel, the Court created the search incident to arrest ex-
ception to allow limited search of an arrestee to protect officer safety and pre-
vent the destruction of evidence.
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting of-
ficer to search the person arrested in order to remove any
weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist ar-
rest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might
well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addi-
tion, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search
for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to
prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into
which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or
2015]
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Court distinguished its prior holding in Smith v. Maryland,33 which
upheld law enforcement's use of a pen register to monitor a sus-
pect's outgoing phone calls from a private residence.
34
The Riley Court relied on three justifications to differenti-
ate cell phones from plastic containers, cigarette packs, or pen reg-
isters: (1) storage capacity, (2) the quality of information stored on
cell phones, and (3) the pervasive use of cell phones in modem so-
ciety.35 Unlike the telephone at issue in Smith, a cell phone stores
vast quantities of personal information and thus implicates unique
privacy concerns. For example, most smart phones can store
sixteen gigabytes of information, which "translates to millions of
pages-of text, thousands of pictures, or hundreds of videos." 37 In
fact, "[e]ven the most basic phones that sell for less than $20 might
hold photographs, picture messages, text messages, Internet
evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like
rule. Id.
33 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).34 Id. at 744. In Smith, the Court relied largely on the fact that Petitioner had no
reasonable expectation of privacy in outgoing telephone calls:
Petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the
telephone company and "exposed" that information to its
equipment in the ordinary course of business. In so doing, pe-
titioner assumed the risk that the company would reveal to po-
lice the numbers he dialed. The switching equipment that pro-
cessed those numbers is merely the modem counterpart of the
operator who, in an earlier day, personally completed calls for
the subscriber. id.
35 See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (upholding the
search of a crumpled cigarette pack found on the arrestee's person that yielded
fourteen grams of heroin); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460, n. 4 (1981)
(upholding the search of a container, which the Court defined as an "object ca-
pable of holding another object").
36 Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. at 2489 ("Cell phones differ in both a quantita-
tive and a qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee's
person").3 7 id.
274
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browsing history, a calendar, a thousand-entry phone book, and so
on."
38
Second, the type of information contained in cell phones
resembles the private papers and effects traditionally protected un-
der the Fourth Amendment. 39 Moreover, "[a] phone not only con-
tains in digital form many sensitive records previously found in the
home; it also contains a broad array of private information never
found in a home in any form... ,40 In fact, cell phones can hold
"in one place many distinct types of information-an address, a
note, a prescription, a bank statement, a video-that reveal much
more in combination than any isolated record."4'Writing for the
majority, Chief Justice Roberts explained how pre-digital era cases
would not protect this information from unwarranted searches:
The fact that a search in the pre-digital era could
have turned up a photograph or two in a wallet does
not justify a search of thousands of photos in a digi-
tal gallery. The fact that someone could have tucked
a paper bank statement in a pocket does not justify
a search of every bank statement from the last five
years. And to make matters worse, such an ana-
logue test would allow law enforcement to search a
range of items contained on a phone, even though
people would be unlikely to carry such a variety of
information in physical form.42
Simply put, warrantless cell phone searches would give
"police officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a
person's private effects. '" 4
3
Third, cell phone use is pervasive in modem society, and
places "vast quantities of personal information literally in the
38 id.
39 id.
40 Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. at 2490.
41 Id. at 2489.
42 Id. at 2492.
43Id. at 2491.
20151 275
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hands of individuals." 44 Indeed, it is "the person who is not carry-
ing a cell phone, with all that it contains, who is the exception.'A5
In fact, "it is no exaggeration to say that many of the more than
90% of American adults who own a cell phone keep on their per-
son a digital record of nearlY every aspect of their lives-from the
mundane to the intimate. '  Moreover, it did not matter that,
"[p]rior to the digital age, people did not typically carry a cache of
sensitive personal information with them as they went about their
day, 'A7 did not "make the information an less worthy of the pro-
tection for which the Founders fought." And searches of cell
phones bore "little resemblance to the type of brief physical
search ' 49 that the Court confronted in other cases. Thus, absent
exigent circumstances, law enforcement must have probable cause
and procure a warrant before searching an arrestee's cell phone.
50
The Court's decision in Riley stands for two fundamental
propositions. First, pre-digital era case law addressing warrantless
searches in the context of physical objects does not apply to mod-
em technological devices. The Riley Court recognized that apply-
ing pre-digital era precedent to cell phones would unmoor the
search incident to arrest doctrine from its original justifications and
result in searches that infringed on privacy protections.
5 1
In fact, detachment from the search incident to arrest doc-
trine's original justifications allowing for infringement on constitu-
tional privacy protections had already occurred in other contexts.
In the years following Chimel, searches incident to arrest steadily
" Id. at 2485.
45 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. at 2490 ("According to one poll, nearly three-
quarters of smart phone users report being within five feet of their phones most
of the time, with 12% admitting that they even use their phones in the shower").
46 Id.
47 Id. ("Allowing the police to scrutinize such records on a routine basis is quite
different from allowing them to search a personal item or two in the occasional
case").
"Id. at 2495.
41 Id. at 2485.
50 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. at 2495. ("Our answer to the question of what
police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is ac-
cordingly simple-get a warrant").
51 Id. at 2482 ("the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonable-
ness") (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)).
276
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expanded in scope and their expansion often had little, if anything,
to do with protecting officer safety or preserving evidence. For ex-
ample, in United States v. Robinson,52 the Supreme Court upheld a
warrantless pat down search of an arrestee that resulted in the dis-
covery of a crumpled cigarette package, and consequently extend-
ed Chimel by permitting searches of the arrestee's person and
"separate search[es] of effects found on his person." 53
In New York v. Belton,54 the Court upheld the search of a
jacket found in the passenger compartment of an arrestee's vehi-
cle, even though the arrestee was already in police custody and
could not reach for or access the jacket. Noting the jacket was lo-
cated "inside the passenger compartment of the car in which the
respondent had been a passenger just before he was arrested,, 55
the Supreme Court nonetheless held that the jacket was "within the
arrestee's immediate control ' 56 within the meaning of Chimel. Jus-
tice Brennan dissented and categorized the decision as "a danger-
ous precedent that is not justified by the concerns underly-
ing Chimer'57  and "inconsistent with every significant search-
incident-to-arrest case."58
In Thornton v. United States, 59 the Supreme Court expand-
ed Belton and Chimel further by permitting warrantless searches of
52 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
" Id. at 255 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (brackets added). The search yielded four-
teen grams of heroin. Id. at 220.
54 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).55 Id. at 462-463 (emphasis added).
5 6 Id. at 462.
57 But see United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977) (invalidating a
search that was "conducted more than an hour after federal agents had gained
exclusive control of the footlocker and long after respondents were securely in
custody; the search therefore [could not] be viewed as incidental to the arrest or
as justified by any other exigency"); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 425
(1981) (distinguishing between automobiles and immovable objects, the latter of
which requires law enforcement to have probable cause and obtain a warrant).
58 Id. (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 456-457 (1971)) (the
search of car in a driveway was not incident to arrest in house); see also Cham-
bers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (the warrantless search of car was invalid
once the arrestee has been placed in police custody); Vale v. Louisiana, 399
U.S., 30, 35 (1970) (the area within an arrestee's immediate control does not
extend to the inside of house when suspect is arrested on front step).
59 Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004).
2015]
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an arrestee's vehicle "when it is reasonable to believe evidence
relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle."
60
This time, Justice Stevens dissented, writing that "uncovering po-
tentially valuable evidence ... must give way to the citizen's con-
stitutionally protected interest in privacy when there is already in
place a well-defined rule limiting the permissible scope of a search
of an arrested pedestrian." 61 Thereafter, in Arizona v. Gant,62 the
Court narrowed Belton by limiting searches incident to arrest to
areas within the arrestee's reach,63 but re-affirmed Thornton by
holding that searches incident to arrest are permissible where law
enforcement reasonably believes "the vehicle contains evidence of
the offense of arrest.
' 6
By this point, Chimel had morphed from a narrow rule to a
rule that permitted law enforcement to evade, if not entirely disre-
gard, the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement. In
fact, the Chimel justifications no longer served as meaningful limi-
tations on searches incident to arrest, leading one commentator to
note that the Supreme Court had stretched Chimel's reasoning
"beyond its breaking point."
65
In Riley, the Supreme Court had enough and established a
categorical rule eschewing reliance on precedent that had, as a
practice matter, swallowed the rule against unreasonable searches
and seizures. As a practical matter, the Court recognized that there
was no precedent to govern cell phone searches, and that, unlike
automobiles, which "seldom serv[e] as one's residence or as the
60 Id. at 632.
61 Id. at 635 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Ross,
456 U.S. 798 (1982) (expanding Chimel by permitting vehicle searches "for evi-
dence relevant to offenses other than the offense of arrest").
62 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332.
631 d. at 351.
64 Id. at 346 (discussing Thornton).
65 Edwin J. Butterfoss, Bright-Line Breaking Point: Embracing Justice Scalia's
Call for the Supreme Court to Abandon An Unreasonable Approach to Fourth
Amendment Search and Seizure Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 77, 101 (2007). see also
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 385 (1976) ("such a search may be
made without attempting to secure the consent of the owner and without any
particular reason to believe the impounded automobile contains contraband, ev-
idence, or valuables, or presents any danger to its custodians or the public").
278
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repository of ersonal effects, ' 66 cell phones implicate basic priva-
cy interests.6p Stated simply, cases from an era of rotary tele-
phones, roll-o-decks, and black and white televisions did not con-
sider or even contemplate the complex interplay between digital
devices, government surveillance, and civil liberties. Put different-
ly, pen registers are not analogous to cell phone towers68 and mo-
bile tracking devices that law enforcement uses monitor the
whereabouts of its citizens,69 just as plastic containers are not
analogous to cell phones. Importantly, however, cell phones are
analogous to private homes, just as the Internet is analogous to a
public sidewalk.
Second, the original meaning and purpose of the Fourth
Amendment-to protect citizens from unreasonable searches-
applies to conduct that the Founders could not foresee. Stating
that "the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasona-
bleness, '70 the Court correctly held that storing private infor-
mation on a cell phone "does not make the information any less
worthy of the protection." 71 Indeed, allowing law enforcement to
conduct searches of a cell phone's contents incident to arrest
would have resulted in the type of "broad, non-particularized
searches," that were "one of the driving forces behind the Revolu-
tion itself., 72 The Court's decision in Riley ushered the Constitu-
tion into the digital era-not by interpreting the Fourth Amend-
ment expansively, but by returning to its original meaning. Chief
66 Carwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (discussing arrestees' reduced
expectation of privacy in automobiles).
67 See generally, Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment extends to all areas where an individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy).68 See, e.g., Klayman v. Obama, 957 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2013).
69 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945 (2012) (holding that law en-
forcement's use of a GPS tracking device to monitor a suspect's whereabouts
for twenty-eight days violated the Fourth Amendment)..
70 Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. at 2482 (quoting Brigham City, 547 U.S. at
403).
71 Id. at 2495.
72 Id. at 2494 ("the Fourth Amendment was the founding generation's response
to the reviled 'general warrants' and 'writs of assistance' of the colonial era,
which allowed British officers to rummage through homes in an unrestrained
search for evidence of criminal activity.")
2015]
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Justice Roberts' majority opinion reflects the principle that times
may have changed, but that does not mean civil liberties warrant
any less protection.
Riley supports a net neutrality doctrine. In the same way
that the Fourth Amendment protects private data from unreasona-
ble searches regardless of whether the data is stored in a closet or
cell phone, the First Amendment protects speech from content dis-
crimination regardless of whether it is disseminated on the side-
walk or through a search engine. It is the speech, not the device
that matters, particularly because the line between public forums
and personal space, and the real and virtual world has collapsed,
and because free, open, and robust debate is the cornerstone of a
~73democratic society.
II. INTERNET SPEECH: THE NEW MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
Internet speech is equivalent to the physical areas that the
Court has traditionally designated as a public or limited purpose
.public forum.
A. Public and Limited Purpose Public Forums
Unlike Riley, legal issues involving online speech are not
governed by outdated case law. To the contrary, the Court's prec-
edent provides the framework by which to protect speech in the
virtual world.
To begin with, the level of protection afforded to speech,
and the validity of government regulations, depends in substantial
part on the forum within which it is expressed. The Court has clas-
sified forums as: (1) public; (2) designated or limited purpose pub-
lic; and (3) non-public. Of course, private property owners may re-
strict access to their property and prohibit unwanted speech.
73 See, e.g., Mark C. Alexander, Citizens United and Equality Forgotten, 35
N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 499, 503 (2011) ("Speech is at the core of our
democratic process, and is an essential part of "a profound national commitment
to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open").
280
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1. Public Forums
Public forums are places that "by long tradition or by gov-
ernment [] have been devoted to assembly and debate." 74 These ar-
eas have "immemorially been held in trust for the use of
the public, and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of
assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discuss-
ing public questions." 75 Thus, "the rights of the state to limit ex-
pressive activity are sharply circumscribed. ' ' 76 The government
may not regulate speech based on its content77 unless it is "neces-
sary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn to achieve that end."78 It may, however, enact reasonable
restrictions of time, place, and manner, provided they are "content-
neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government in-
terest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communica-
tion.",79 Public streets and parks are examples of public forums.
80
74 Perry Educ. Ass 'n,, 460 U.S. at 45.
75 Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
76 Perry Educ. Ass 'n., 460 U.S. at 45.
77 In determining whether speech regulations impermissibly discriminate based
on content, the courts examine whether the regulation restricts speech because
of disagreement with its message. See, e.g., Clark, 468 U.S. at 295 (1984)
("[t]he principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, in speech cases gen-
erally and in time, place, or manner cases in particular, is whether the govern-
ment has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the mes-
sage it conveys; see also Frisby,487 U.S. at 474 ("[t]he government may not
regulate use based on hostility-or favoritism-towards the underlying message
expressed"); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) ("[ajll ideas hav-
ing even the slightest redeeming social importance-unorthodox ideas, contro-
versial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion-have the
full protection of [First Amendment] guaranties").
78 Perry Educ. Ass 'n, 460 U.S. at 45. (citing Carey, 447 U.S. at 461).
79 Id. (citing United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh, 453 U.S.
114, 132 (1981)); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S.
530, 535-536 (1980)).80id.
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2. Designated or Limited Purpose Public Forums
A designated or limited purpose public forum consists of
"public property that the state has opened for use by the public as a
place for expressive activity."81 Public schools, university meeting
facilities, and municipal theaters typically fall within this catego-
82ry.
The same standards governing regulation of speech in a
traditional public forum should apply to limited purpose public fo-
rums.83 Thus, unless narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
interest, 84 content-based exclusions are impermissible "even if
[the state] was not required to create the forum in the first place.
85
3. Nonpublic Forum
Non-public forums consist of public property that "is not
by tradition or designation a forum for public communication. 86
As a result, "the state may reserve the forum for its intended pur-
poses, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on
speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression mere-
ly because public officials oppose the speaker's view."87 In other
words, content-based regulations are permissible, but once the
government allows speech on a particular topic (e.g., abortion) in a
non-public forum, it may not discriminate based on the speaker's
view about that topic.
88
B. Content and Viewpoint Discrimination in the Internet's
81 id.
82See id. (citing City of Madison Joint School District v. Wiscon-
sin Public Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976)); Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263; Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546
(1975)); see also First Amendment Schools, What is a Public Forum, available
at http://www.firstamendmentschools.org/freedoms/faq.aspx?id = 13012
83 Perry Educ. Ass"n, 460 U.S. at 45.84 Id. at 46.
85 Id. (brackets added).
86 ld. at 46
87 Id.
8 8 id.
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Public, Limited Purpose, and Non-Public Forums
The Internet is the equivalent of traditional public
forums, limited purpose public forums, and non-public fo-
rums. The Internet's traditional public forum refers to the
free and open transfer of data between networks, which
ISPs control. The Internet's limited purpose public forum
refers to websites that are held out to the public as forums
for debate on matters of public concern. Non-public forums
refer to personal blogs, websites, and social media where
the owner has an unconditional right to speak and assemble
without granting access to disfavored content or viewpoint.
The Pre-Digital Era Analogs to Digital Devices Table be-
low provides examples of online public, limited purpose,
and private forums.
PRE-DIGITAL ERA ANALOGS TO DIGITAL DEVICES
HISTORICAL DIGITAL DEVICE STANDARD
ANALOG 
-
PRIVA, RESIDENCE CELL PHONE PROBABLE CAUSF
I AND A WARRANT
UNLESS LAW
ENFORCEMENT CAN
SHOW EXIGENT
__CIRCUMSTANCES
SIDEWALK OR [ (INTERNET) FREE STRICT SCRUTINY
STREET CORNER FLOW OF
(TRADITIONAL INFORMATION
PUBLIC FORUM) BETWEEN
NETWORKS
LIMITED OR .(INTERNET)
DESIGNATED PUBLIC WEBSITES THAT
FORUM ARE FORUMS FOR
REASONABLE
RESTRICTIONS Of
TrME, PLACE, AND
2015]
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PUBLIC DISCUSSION MANNER PROVIDED
ON MATTERS OF THEY ARE CONTENT-
PUBLIC CONCERN NEUTRAL89
(E.G., HUFFINGTON
POST)-
NONPUBLIC FORUM I EMAIL, FACEBOOK, CONTENT-BASED
TWITITER, CHAT RESTRICTIONS ARE
ROOMS, PRIVATE PERMISSIBLE
BLOGS, CLOSED
GROUPS
As discussed below, ISPs and website operators can in-
fringe substantially on first Amendment Protections. First, ISPs
can discriminate on the basis of the user's identity (e.g., a business
competitor or political rival) or the content of a user's speech. Se-
cond, websites operators can discriminate based on viewpoint, ei-
ther by deleting disfavored comments or restricting access to
members who have unpopular opinions. Both practices violate the
First Amendment.
1. Preventing Content Discrimination in the Traditional Public
Forum. Treating ISPs As Common Carriers or Radio
Broadcasters
Without a new neutrality doctrine, First Amendment free-
doms in the virtual world will be under attack in the same way that
privacy rights were under attack before Riley.
ISPs can compromise free speech protections in a variety
of ways. The first is through "traffic shaping," 90 a practice that
"involves slowing down some forms of traffic, like file-sharing,
89 Some courts apply different tests depending on whether the speaker falls
within the class of individuals that the government intended to benefit by creat-
ing limited public forum. See, e.g., Fighting Finest v. Bratton, 95 F.3d 224, 225-
28 (2d Cir. 1996) (if the speaker falls within the intended class, strict scrutiny is
applied; if the speaker falls outside of the class, rational basis review is applied).
90 Steffe, supra note 4, at 1158.
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while giving others priority." 91 This is accomplished by limiting
available bandwidth, which enables ISPs to favor certain catego-
ries of speech over others. Comcast, for example, has been ac-
cused of manipulating the available bandwidth of its users so that
users of popular peer-to-peer programs, such as BitTorrent and
eDonkey, would become frustrated and terminate any pending
transfers., 92 This practice is akin to allowing pro-life advocates to
march in the public square, while restricting pro-choice advocates
to a dark alley near a cemetery. It permits ISPs to discriminate
against "websites that are resource intensive ... offer services that
might compete against an ISPs own services ... or even discourage
traffic to networks it disapproves.
'
"
93
In addition, ISPs can restrict access to online content. For
example, ISPs view websites, such as CNN, as potential sources of
income and charge user fees to access an ISP's subscribers, which
can number in the millions. 94 This permits ISPs to "hold a website
at ransom ' '95 and forces websites "to choose between complying
and exploring new sources of revenue by either eliciting higher
fees for advertising on their websites or charging users fees for
use, or simply dissolving." 96 What is worse, organizations that sell
commercial products or promote public debate on matters of polit-
ical and social importance may fail to reach a substantial audience
and, in some cases, cease operating altogether. Simply put, ISPs
can structure their fees in a manner that undermines competition,
thwarts innovation, and frustrates open public debate.
The effect on users is substantial. By restricting access to,
or slowing the delivery of, commercial and political speech, users
are deprived of vast quantities of information. The Internet is a
hub for free market competition, the free exchange of information,
and the free flow of ideas on topics that span the political, social,
artistic, and literary spectrum. Indeed corporations throughout the
91 Id. at 1158 (quoting Peter Svensson, Comcast Blocks Some Internet Traffic,
MSNBC (Oct. 19, 2007), available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21376597
I).
92 Steffe, supra note 4, at 1158.
93 Id. at 1156-57.94 id
95 Id. at 1159.9 6
id.
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world "rely heavily on the Internet and services provided over
the Internet to conduct business ... [and] to communicate efficient-
ly.",97 Furthermore, the Internet has taken center stage in political
campaigns and become a forum for public debate over matters that
promote the very foundation our individual freedoms are based
upon.98 One commentator states:
Despite the scant attention it received from politi-
cians during the 1990s, early online political activ-
ists expected the Internet to be "the dominant polit-
ical medium by the year 2000." While their
timetable for dominance may have been a bit opti-
mistic, the massive growth in Internet use during
the last few years of the twentieth century began the
push in that direction. In 1997, only eighteen per-
cent of households had an Internet connection. By
2000, that number had grown to forty-two per-
cent.
99
Indeed, "[b]y 2003, 54.7 percent of American households
had Internet access ... [and] the Internet was ready to play a criti-
97 Id.(brackets added).
98 See D. Wes Sullenger, Silencing the Blogosphere, A First Amendment Cau-
tion to Legislators Considering Using Blogs to Communicate Directly with
Constituents 13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 15, 54-55 (2007).
99 Id. at 53-54. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, politicians began
using the internet as a campaign tool:
Thanks to increased accessibility, by the 2000 election, presi-
dential candidates viewed the Internet as an ally. Candidates
used the Internet to raise money, to make announcements, and
to post their policy positions, speeches, and criticisms of their
adversaries. Also by the 2000 election cycle, candidates had
begun coupling these less-passive websites with database
technology to identify likely voters who might be receptive to
their messages. This technology let politicians tailor their
messages to specific voters so they could, through technology,
establish a "personal, one-on-one relationship" with citizens.
Id.
286
20
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 2
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol25/iss2/2
RILEY V. CALIFORNIA
cal role in political campaigning."'' 00 In 2004, "[g]overnments
throughout the United States had begun trying to connect the pub-
lic to the government through 'e-government' initiatives,"'01
which enables citizens to "e-mail government staff directly and to
access public services online."' 10 2 During this period, "thousands of
citizens [became] high-tech colonial pamphleteers in a planetary
public square, using computers and modems to recruit and organ-
ize without leaving their keyboards."' 0 3
To prevent ISPs from infringing on First Amendment pro-
tections, the FCC treats ISPs as common carriers, preventing ISPs
from charging different prices, and interfering with or manipulat-
ing the Internet traffic based on a user's identity, or the content of
a user's message. The Communications Act of 1934 provides the
statutory basis for justifying such a regulation:
It shall be unlawful for any common carrier to make
any unjust or unreasonable discrimination in charg-
es, practices, classifications, regulations, facilities,
or services for or in connection with like communi-
cation service, directly or indirectly, by any means
or device, or to make or give any undue or unrea-
sonable preference or advantage to any particular
person, class of persons, or locality, or to subject
any particular person, class of persons, or locality to
any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disad-
vantage. 1
04
Indeed, just as the Pacific Telegraph Act prohibited the
"processing and relaying [of] private telegraphs on any other basis
than in the order in which received, ' ° 5 a net neutrality doctrine
would prohibit ISPs "from interfering with the transmission of
packets over their networks, whether by artificially slowing down
10o Id. (brackets added).
'0 Id. at 57.
102 Id.
103 Id. (brackets in original).
104 Steffe, supra note 4, at 1154-55.
105 id
2015] 287
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or blocking those packets, or by any other means that selectively
inhibits the natural flow of packets over their network."' 6
As the FCC has recognized, consumers would benefit sub-
stantially from a net neutrality doctrine:
Consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet
content of their choice ... to run applications and
use services of their choice, subject to the needs of
law enforcement to connect their choice of legal
devices that do not harm the network[;] ... [and] to
competition among network providers, application
and service providers, and content providers. 07
In fact, the Court has recognized that First Amendment
principles apply to the Internet precisely because it has become a
forum for disseminating protected speech:
Unlike the conditions that prevailed when Congress
first authorized regulation of the broadcast spec-
trum, the Internet can hardly be considered a
"scarce" expressive commodity. It provides rela-
tively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communica-
tion of all kinds ... This dynamic, multifaceted cat-
egory of communication includes not only
traditional print and news services, but also audio,
video, and still images, as well as interactive, real-
time dialogue. Through the use of chat rooms, any
person with a phone line can become a town crier
with a voice that resonates farther than it could
from any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages,
mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same individ-
ual can become a pamphleteer ... our cases provide
no basis for qualifying the level of First Amend-
1 61d. at 1155.
107 id.
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ment scrutiny that should be applied to this medi-
108
urn.
The proper way to promote free speech and guard against
content-based discrimination is through a new neutrality doctrine.
ISPs may argue that decisions regarding pricing constitute
commercial speech, and that regulating this practice would amount
to impermissible restrictions on this speech. In addition, even if
ISPs were subject to the First Amendment, practices involving
pricing are based on content neutral factors, such as the numbers
of emails a corporation sends. This argument fails to consider that
ISPs have primary control over the flow of information between
networks, and thus have the power to infringe on free speech
rights. Additionally, otherwise-permissible speech may be regulat-
ed if the secondary effects of this speech bring it into a category
that does not enjoy First Amendment protection.10 9
2. Limited Purpose Public Forum: Websites For Public
Comments on Matters of Public Concern
ISPs are not the only entities that can infringe First
Amendment freedoms online. Various websites such as The Na-
tional Review and Huffington Post hold themselves out as forums
for debate on political and social issues. In doing so, these web-
sites make available to the public a forum within which users can
debate a variety of public policy issues. This certainly enhances
the robust exchange of information and creates an online market-
place of ideas historically, but it can also be a vehicle for view-
point discrimination, in the same way that cell phones became a
vehicle for intrusive searches into an individual's private life.
For example, National Review Online, a conservative fo-
rum, could require that registered democrats pay a twenty-five dol-
lar fee before gaining access to the "Comments" section of each
108 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (internal citations omitted).109 See, e.g., Mark Rienzi & Stuart Buck, Neutral No More: Secondary Effects
Analysis and the Demise of the Content-Neutrality Test, 82 FORDHAM L. REv.
1187 (2013); see also R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 389 (quoting Renton v. Playtime The-
aters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (2006)).
2015] 289
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article. Alternatively, National Review could carefully filter or any
comments that it disfavors or deems contrary to conservative ide-
ology. Similarly, the Huffington Post could decide to charge regis-
tered republicans a ten-dollar "access fee" and reserve the right to
modify or remove comments it deems 'too conservative.
Of course, both the National Review and Huffington post
have the right to remove all comments that are obscene, defamato-
ry, or likely to incite violence, and even have the leeway to remove
offensive comments. This is not a license, however, to allow user
comments on political issues, yet to subjectively skew the debate
by discriminating opposing viewpoints. In other words, websites
and blogs that are marketed out as venues for public discussion are
limited purpose public forums; they may regulate the time, place,
and of speech, but such regulations must not be thinly veiled at-
tempts to discriminate on the basis of a user's viewpoint.
Put differently, having made the choice to invite public
comments, these websites have the responsibility to comply with
the law. For example, when private individuals who open a busi-
ness that serves the public, or rent homes to prospective buyers,
they cannot refuse to serve African Americans, regardless of the
storeowner or landlord's privately held beliefs. The same princi-
ples should apply to websites holding themselves out as a forum
for public comment on matters of public concern.
Additionally, the FCC can regulate ISPs in the same way
that it regulates public broadcasting with the equal time rule,' 0
which requires broadcasting stations "that permit candidates to ap-
pear on their airwaves [to] allow opposing candidates the same
privilege.""'1 This rule is subject to a variety of exceptions, but is
based on the principle that "those who control access to them are
viewed as being responsible for what those who are not in control
get to see and hear." ' 1 2 The same holds true on the Internet be-
cause website operators, like ISPs, have the exclusive authority to
control how information is accessed, expressed, disseminated. Al-
lowing the internet to become a breeding ground for content and
110 Anne Kramer Ricchiuto, The End of Time for Equal Time? Revealing the
Statutory Myth of Fair Election Coverage, 38 IND. L. REV. 267, 268 (2008)
i1 Id. [brackets added].
112 Id. at 269.
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viewpoint-based discrimination would eviscerate core First
Amendment freedoms in an electronic medium that, like cell
phones, is pervasive in modem society.
3. Non-Public Forums
Non-public forums, which would include personal websites
and blogs, do not implicate First Amendment concerns. In non-
public forums, the First Amendment protects each individual's
right of assembly and association, both of which would be in-
fringed if individuals were required to accommodate opposing
viewpoints in forums that are not held out to or intended for public
debate.
IV. CONCLUSION
Recent innovations in technology ushered civil liberties in-
to the virtual world. Consequently, the law must adapt by provid-
ing legal protections to the civil liberties of individuals who speak,
assemble, and associate in that world. The original purposes of the
First Amendment, which from time immemorial have protected
civil liberties and preserved the free, open, and robust exchange of
information, support net neutrality. After all, laws or practices that
violate cherished freedoms in the physical world also violate those
freedoms in the virtual world. The battle over net neutrality is "is
absolutely the First Amendment issue of our time," just as warrant-
less searches of cell phones were among the Fourth Amendment
issues of our time.
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